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THEORY OF SENTIMENTAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS
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For Adam Smith, a crime is not the result of a rational calculation of loss and gain
but the consequence of envy and a vain desire to parade wealth to attract the
approbation of others, combined with a natural systematic bias in overestimating the
probability of success. Similarly, Smith does not conceive of legal sanctions as a
rational deterrent but as deriving from the feeling of resentment. While the prevailing
approach of the eighteenth century is a rational explanation of crime and a utilitarian
use of punishment, Adam Smith instead builds his theory of criminal behavior and
legal prosecution consistently on the sentiments. A well-functioning legal system is
thus an unintended consequence of our desire to bring justice to the individual person,
not the result of a rational calculation to promote the public good, just like a wellfunctioning economic system is the unintended consequence of our desire to better our
own condition, not the result of a rational calculation to promote public good.

I. INTRODUCTION
Why do we commit crimes? How can we punish crime effectively? The two questions
are interrelated. To punish crime one needs to understand why there is crime to begin
with. The interrelation of these two questions, and their historical context, is relevant to
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better understanding of human beings and to reforming a criminal justice system that is
deemed outdated.
In eighteenth-century Europe, the challenges to understanding crime and punishment
come from both intellectual curiosity and a reforming spirit. The “Science of Man” that
David Hume introduces calls for a scientiﬁc understanding of human nature and human
conduct in all its aspects, including deviant behaviors. The criminal justice system often
symbolizes the outdated, violent, and above all irrational Ancien Regime’s institutions
(Foucault 1975). “Legal Enlightenment” is a term that is commonly used to indicate the
intellectual movement that deals mostly with how to rationally reform existing legal
systems (see, for example, Marcos 2009; Grossi 2010; and Padoa Schioppa 2017). Its
deﬁning characteristics are: the lay deﬁnition of crime as social damage, which produces
a loss of welfare; the idea of punishment whose only purpose is the defense of society
against crimes; and the attempt to elaborate a rational theory of punishment to discourage
the greatest number of crimes with the minimum of social costs.
What distinguishes the authors of this new trend, such as Charles de Secondat
Montesquieu ([1748] 1989), Cesare Beccaria ([1764] 1986), Pietro Verri ([1776–77]
2010), Voltaire ([1777] 1999), Gaetano Filangieri ([1780–91] 1984), and Jeremy
Bentham ([1780] 1948], is the utilitarian explanation of criminal behavior. For them,
crime is the choice of a rational individual who calculates expected value and costs and
who rationally chooses to commit a crime when the expected value of the crime exceeds
the expected cost of its legal consequences. Reform of the criminal system implies
tinkering with these expected costs and beneﬁts so that the expected costs would exceed
the expected beneﬁts, thus creating deterrence and an eventual decrease in crime. Gary
Becker and Richard Posner (e.g., Becker 1968; Posner 1973) place the contemporary
branch of economics known as “Law and Economics” within the tradition of this Legal
Enlightenment literature.
Even in the narrower Scottish context, and of the University of Glasgow in particular,
where Adam Smith taught jurisprudence, the dominant justiﬁcation for the existence of
criminal punishment was the utilitarian explanation of deterrence. As John Cairns (1988)
testiﬁes, the standard teaching of Scottish law implied that crimes are a threat against
society, and need to be punished for the public interest and for the terror of others, as John
Erskine ([1754] 2018) would say (see also Forbes [1730] 2013; Mackenzie [1722] 2010;
and Bayne [1730] 2010). Even Henry Home, Lord Kames ([1758] 2019), who has a
sentiment-based theory of punishment based on resentment and indignation (but as we
will see differs from Adam Smith in having no impartial spectator to control revenge),
sees punishment as a deterrent tool for public control for public utility. David Hume
himself ([1739] 1976) also offers a theory of justice as an “artiﬁcial virtue” based on
utility (Raphael 1972–73; Fleischacker 1988).
In this intellectual context, Adam Smith stands out as different from the other
scholars. Smith not only is well familiar with the views of his predecessors and
contemporaries in Scotland, but he also knows the works of Beccaria and Verri and
other Legal Enlightenment scholars—in his library there are copies of their works
(Mizuta 2000). Yet he distances himself from the Scottish and European mainstream
of his age, grounding his theory of crime and punishment consistently in human
sentiments rather than rationalism and utilitarianism. Smith proposes a theory of crime
and punishment that is far from, if not even opposite to, Cesare Beccaria, Gaetano
Filangieri, and later Jeremy Bentham (Simon 2009). Smith was joined in this by his
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student and successor in teaching jurisprudence at Glasgow, John Millar ([1779] 2006),
who followed a closely similar approach where a wrong is a wrong to the individual and,
even if the public interest is also wronged, that role is secondary (Cairns 1988).
We suggest that this deep divergence is the consequence of a particular anthropological view of human beings. For Smith, people are not hedonistic pleasure seekers or
rational calculators (see, among others, Witztum and Young 2013). In The Theory of
Moral Sentiments (A. Smith [1759] 1984; hereinafter TMS), indeed, Smith describes
persons whose strongest wish is not the egoistic satisfaction of their needs but who, on
the contrary, seek social interactions that bring the happiness of shared feelings of
reciprocal esteem (e.g., TMS I.i.1.1, p. 9; TMS I.i.2.1, pp. 13–14, among others). This
view of human beings offers a consistent understanding of both the motivation to
commit a crime and the justiﬁcation of its punishment, even if it may take different
forms in different historical contexts. As Craig Smith (2018) points out, this sentimental
approach is typical of Adam Smith. Adam Smith grounds even philosophy in sentiments
and the psychological need to understand the world. Utility is not an original motivation
of scientiﬁc enquiry, just as it is not a motivation of crimes or punishments.
In this, we follow David D. Raphael’s (1972–73) understanding of Smith as nonutilitarian (see, among many, also Witzum and Young 2013; cf. Hollander 2016). But
while Raphael looks at Smith’s general philosophy and contrasts it (mostly) with
Hume’s, we contextualize Smith’s discourse on the criminal justice system within the
Enlightenment debate on reforming the criminal justice. Thus, we add to the existing
analyses of Smith, such as those by Neil MacCormick (1981), Knud Haakonssen (1981),
Alan Norrie (1989), Ralph Lindgreen (1994), Eric Miller (1996), John Salter (1999),
Gloria Vivenza (2008), and Richard Stalley (2012), which tend to look only at the
justiﬁcation of punishment but not at the motivation of crime or at the historical
contextualization of the criminal justice system. We focus instead on Smith’s understanding of both the sentimental motivation of crime and of punishment and his
historical jurisprudence; we thus highlight how Smith focuses on the individual person
and their passions as opposed to an explicit attempt to achieve social optimality, making
his legal theory consistent with his economic theory of individual actions and unintended
social consequences. Our analysis of Smith’s view of human nature allows us to present
a more complete picture of Smith’s understanding of crime and institutional formation.

II. WHY CRIME?
If Smith buys into the Humean “science of man” (Phillipson 2010), he also buys into the
Humean idea of a philosopher as an “anatomist,” someone who just describes how things
are, rather than as a “painter” who shows how they should be (C. Smith 2018). Smith’s
primary concern is thus with the understanding of how we develop and use moral
judgment, rather than with teaching people how to act, as his teacher Francis Hutcheson
and his contemporary Adam Ferguson, for example, did (Campbell 2013). The recognition of Smith’s description of a natural basis of justice (Haakonssen 1981) is unambiguous in the literature, even if some see it as a fault in Smith’s theory (Fleischacker
2005) so big that it may have prevented Smith from completing his third planned book
on jurisprudence (Griswold 1999), while others see it instead as an application of what
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Frank Knight (1944) would later call a “relative-absolute” (Rizzo 2020). Smith does not
seem interested in identifying universal principles of justice. Instead he is interested in
their formation and use, which may vary with their historical context but which work as
if absolute within each individual context.
Smith needs to ﬁnd what is ﬁxed and what is contingent in human behavior (Smith
1982, “History of Metaphysics”). He identiﬁes a few characteristics that are constant in
people across time and place—characteristics of human nature. What is relevant for us
here is that human beings want to be, and we believe we are, the center of the universe
and that all revolves around us (TMS III.iii.3–4, pp. 135–136): we want people’s
attention, we want their love and esteem. We naturally want to be the (proper) object
of the approbation of others, but we are also naturally biased by our self-love.
The desire for approbation is one of those universal ﬁrst principles from which
Smith derives the explanation of complex social phenomena and the possibility of
formulating general laws.1 Smith clariﬁes that the desire to receive the approbation of
others is related to, but not the same as, the desire to be the proper object of
approbation. That is, we desire to be approvable, not just approved. The desire to be
approved is derived from our innate desire to be approvable. We learn to become the
proper object of approbation by observing and replicating approvable conduct in
others, and by observing real or imaginary others looking at our own conduct.
Becoming the proper object of approbation, as Smith describes it, is a lifelong process
and never fully achieved (TMS III.3).
For Smith, our self-love makes us believe that things that are close to us are bigger
than they are, and things that are farther away are smaller than they are. The loss of a
little ﬁnger for us is more important than the loss of the distant population of China.
The “eye of the mind” needs to learn with experience how to correctly perceive
distances, which means that we need to realize we are not the center of the universe
but just one in a multitude (Levy 1995; Paganelli 2017). This is achieved, in part at
least, through the interaction of another innate sentiment: our desire to be lovely and
not to be hateful, our desire to be approvable and not to be the proper object of
disapprobation. Our desire to be lovely counterbalances our self-love and helps us
lower the pitch of our passions so that we can gain the approbation of others, either a
physical other or an imaginary other. This imaginary other, or what Smith calls the
“inhabitant of our breast” or the “man within,” is a spectator of our actions who learns
to distance himself enough from us to become impartial in his judgment. He is a
hypothetical individual, who is independent and unconnected with the facts and
persons involved, whose opinion represents that of humanity in general and one that
could be shared by each man. He is an invisible advisor who helps us moderate our
passions and develop moral conduct (TMS III.iii.4, p. 137; TMS VII.ii.1.44, p. 292).
The approbation of this spectator is the mechanism Smith adopts to give an objective
value to an essentially subjective morality. So we cannot ﬁnd a villain on earth willing
to keep their little ﬁnger at the expense of the destruction of the entire population of
China (TMS III.3.5, pp. 136–137). The impartiality of this spectator, though, is never
perfectly achieved, since we, as humans, are not perfectible.

1
On the inﬂuence of Newtonianism on Smith’s works, see Hetherington (1983); Cremaschi (1989); Redman
(1993); Fiori (2012); Montes (2013).
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One problem we encounter with the development of our impartial spectator is that
we naturally admire the rich and thus we may conﬂate wealth with virtue. Indeed,
according to Smith, we gain approbation in two ways: by being moral and by parading
our wealth. We naturally admire a just and virtuous man, just like we naturally look up
to the rich and we look down on the poor. We want the rich in the spotlight and we do
not want to see the poor. A poor person is ashamed of his poverty and wishes to become
invisible to the eyes of others. A rich person proudly shows off his riches, gaining
everybody’s attention and admiration. This is simply a description of human behavior.
Smith does not endorse it or express moral judgment of it. But he remarks that this
admiration for the rich exists, and is necessary, even if it can be a source of moral
corruption.
The admiration for the rich allows for peace and order in society. Peace and order in
society rest in part on the authority of its leaders. Both wealth and virtue give authority,
but since it is easier to recognize wealth than virtue, our natural admiration for the rich
potentially decreases conﬂicts of legitimacy (TMS VI.i.1.21, p. 266; see also Tegos
2013).
Such admiration for the rich is also necessary because of the complexity and the
contradictions of the human soul. Nature has predisposed it to balance another innate and
spontaneous feeling: envy, which otherwise could destroy social coexistence and
impede the accumulation of wealth and the consequent progress. For example, see
Wealth of Nations (hereinafter WN, [1776] 1981, V.i.b.2, pp. 709–710); and Smith’s
Lectures on Jurisprudence (hereinafter LJB, [1762–63, 1766] 1982); LJB (I.13, p. 402).
Riches glitter and are more easily recognizable than virtue. So we tend to rely more on
wealth than on virtue to gain approbation. Not everybody has the same learning
experiences in life. So if the “man within the breast” has not learned to be fully impartial,
the admiration that wealth generates may became seductive to the point of overcoming
the pleasure derived from moral actions and shadowing the consequences of reprehensible behavior (TMS I.iii.3.8, pp. 64–65). When this happens, the adulation of the
external spectators prevails over the judgment of the inner spectator, and the moral
restraint is weakened. Some will be more easily lured by this external adulation than
others. Criminal behavior arises in those who wish to show their own wealth to the
point of obtaining it by going beyond the bounds of justice (TMS III.iii.31, pp. 149–
150). We may read the envy that leads the poor to steal from the rich (WN, V.i.b.2,
pp. 709–710; and LJB I.13, p. 402) as a subset of this general case, as we discuss
later in the paper.
So Smith thinks that the two ways of achieving approbation are not always compatible (TMS I.iii.3.2, p. 62). The best possible scenario is when the two circumstances are
both present and people acquire riches and a respectable social status by hard work and
fair and virtuous behavior. This is a slow and gradual process, though. It is also the most
common.
Since wealth is much easier to recognize than virtue, for some there is the irresistible
temptation to increase wealth at the expense of virtue, especially since we tend to forgive
and forget the questionable actions of the rich, given how much we look up to them.
Alexander the Great is an example that Smith uses to make the case (TMS VI.iii.28,
p. 250): his greatness was achieved through great crimes. Yet, because of his successes,
we tend to overlook those great crimes he committed to achieve his great success. So we
call him “the Great” and admire him. Alexander the Great is an example of the reason
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why, according to Smith, we may commit crimes: our desire to gain great approbation
from others.
For Smith, this also applies to the great merchants and manufacturers of the Wealth of
Nations ([1776] 1981), who are willing to “extort from the legislature … laws … written
in blood” (WN IV.viii.17, p. 648), not only because they criminalize behaviors that
would otherwise be natural, such as trade that now becomes smuggling (e.g., WN V.ii.
b.6, pp. 826–827; and WN V.ii.k.64, p. 898), but especially because they are willing and
able to found and defend “a great empire” using the “treasure and blood” of their fellowcountrymen to enrich themselves at the expense of the great body of society (WN IV.vii.
c.63, p. 613; see also Paganelli 2008, 2009). From the early stages of colonization, “folly
and injustice” (WN IV.vii.b.59, p. 588) drive the race for the wealth of the colonizers, to
the “servants” of joint stock companies, of the East India Company in particular, who are
“perfectly indifferent” to the disaster they leave the colonies in when they “pervert
administration of justice” of the colonies so that they can take with them immense riches
(WN IV.vii.c.105–106, pp. 638–640): our desire to show off wealth blinds us so much
that we commit even the most atrocious crimes.
On a smaller scale, this happens even when a poor person wishes to become more
visible and adopts a “loose system of morality” more typical of the wealthy, rather than
maintaining the “austere system of morality” more appropriate for his poor condition.
His desire to show off, to appear what he is not, will lead the poor man into dissipation
and crime (WN V.i.g.10, p. 794). Note that, for Smith, obscurity itself is not enough to
incentivize the poor to commit crimes. Indeed, when a man of low condition sinks in the
obscurity of a large city, he may abandon himself to “proﬂigacy and vice” but not
necessarily to crimes (WN V.i.g.12, p. 795). Similarly, need alone is not enough of a
motivation for crime, in Smith’s account. “Want” needs to be accomplished by the
“indignation of the poor” against the rich and that needs to be “prompted by envy” (WN
V.i.b.2, p. 710).
Thus, for Smith, it is the prospect of gaining great wealth, enough to change our status
in the eyes of others, that may motivate some to commit crimes. Smith also explains that
the greatness of Alexander, as well as of the ﬁrst colonizers and of merchants and
manufacturers, of their great crimes and successes, comes from their great self-delusion.
Our natural self-delusion is indeed an aspect of our natural self-love (e.g., Schliesser
2006; Hanley 2009; Fleischacker 2011), which systematically biases and distorts our
perception of reality, and which, Smith explains, may lead some to crime.
Our self-love naturally biases us so that we do not perceive probability correctly. We
may understand that the probability of failure in some speciﬁc activity is very high, but
we are convinced we are exempt from it. We love ourselves too much to admit failure, or
its probability. That probability applies to others, not to us. For Smith, our natural
overconﬁdence, which every person in relative good health has, is what explains the
proﬁtability of lotteries and the lack of proﬁtability of insurance (WN I.x.b.26–28,
pp. 124–126). The expected value of a lottery is less than its cost, yet many play because
they are biased by their “presumptuous hope of success.” Of course, they will lose.
Mirroring this, the expected value of insuring a ship at sea is higher than its cost, but few
merchants insure their ships, according to Smith, because they overestimate their
probability of success and underestimate their probability of failure.
The same presumptuous hope of success is also present in the choice of professions,
including joining the army in the hope of vain glory (WN I.x.b.30–32, pp. 126–127).
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The dangers are underestimated and the probability of glory overestimated so much so
that young boys join the army against the will of their fathers in great numbers, and as an
unintended consequence drive down the salary of soldiers. That presumptuous hope of
success also applies to criminal professions, such as smuggling. Smuggling is the most
proﬁtable profession, when successful. But the chances of success are very low. High
proﬁts attract more and more people, who in their turn, lower the probability of success,
increasing the proﬁts of the successful ones (WN I.x.b.33, pp. 127–128).
Smith seems to imply that our self-delusion affects the perception of the size of what
we may gain, further biasing our “calculation.” The “absurd conﬁdence” that no
“judgment of sober reason and experience” would support led to the baseless belief
that in the new lands of the Americas, one could ﬁnd Eldorado (WN IV.vii.b.18–20,
pp. 562–564). Alexander’s delusion of his own grandeur, his estimation of his probability of success of how much he could gain, was so distorted that it resembled “folly.”
Yet, he succeeded and became “the Great.” No rational calculation would have ever
allowed someone to do what Alexander the Great’s “folly” did (TMS VI.iii.28, p. 250).
So, the other side of the coin of the motivation for crimes, for Smith, is our self-delusion,
our systematic bias in perceiving probability of success and failure. This is as close as it
gets to a rational calculation, in Smith’s analysis. It is not much, given the role selfdelusion plays. A potential smuggler evaluates his expected beneﬁts and expected costs
and acts according to his calculation. But passions prevent this calculation from being
“rational” since our self-love systematically biases our perception of the probabilities.
Due to self-delusion, there are more smugglers than is “optimal,” to use today’s
terminology, and most of them fail.
There are a couple of additional things to note here. First, even if one wishes to
interpret Smith’s analysis as a somewhat “rational calculation of costs and beneﬁts,” one
should not ignore that, according to Smith, this attitude, which induces a person to earn
more and more riches and accumulate properties, is not meant as a hedonistic form of
satisfaction typical of utilitarianism, since it aims at a different range of pleasures. A
person wishes to have at their disposal a great amount of wealth not simply to enjoy a
high degree of utility according to some rational scheme of consumption: the stomach of
a rich man is about the same as the stomach of a poor man. But we want more and more
riches because, by showing them off, we can be the object of the attention and admiration
of our fellows (e.g‥ WN I.xi.c.31, p. 190; TMS VI.i.3, pp. 212–213).
Second, and this may be one of the greatest limitations, if not the greatest one, of
Smith’s model: Smith can explain only crimes done to achieve gains great enough to
change our social status. He does not explain small crimes, or petty crimes where the
criminal gains only a small amount. He simply claims we disapprove of those petty
crimes and look down on the person who committed them (TMS VI.i.16, p. 217). One
may infer that petty crimes may be a miniature version of large crimes, where our
delusions induce us to think that the disapprobation we will receive is less than it is. But
Smith himself does not describe this in any detail.
Even with this limitation, not only is Smith far from the Legal Enlightenment’s
understanding of rational crimes—our sentiments always “interfere” by systematically
biasing our calculations—but his understanding of what makes something a crime is also
far from that of the Legal Enlightenment: it is based on our vanity, the systematic biases
of our self-love, and the presence of an impartial spectator, even if that spectator is not
perfectly impartial. We all share these characteristics, but since nurture is what
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differentiates a street porter from a philosopher (WN I.ii.4, pp. 28–29), the magnitude
of these passions will vary across individuals, allowing for virtuous people as well as
criminals, depending on how much the “man within” has learned to be impartial in a
person’s life.
Unlike the utilitarian authors, Smith does not believe that a utilitarian calculation can
deduce the laws of justice or that a valuation that correctly foresees beneﬁts and losses
can determine the morality of an action. Knud Haakonssen (1981, p. 183) saw this antiutilitarianism in Smithian jurisprudence; and Amos Witzum and Jeffrey Young (2013)
are even willing to see utility and justice as substitutes in Smith. Indeed, Smith assigns
the task of approving human actions to the spontaneous sentiments and judgment of the
impartial spectator, as described in Part I of TMS. For Smith, it is the spontaneous feeling
of the impartial spectator’s reaction that identiﬁes what is illicit. This thesis marks an
even further distance between Smith and the Legal Enlightenment for which the
formulation of general rules of conduct is an ex ante analysis of the allegedly ﬁnal
effects of human actions. Indeed, scholars within the Legal Enlightenment tradition,
such as Beccaria, conceive crime as the activity for which the gains an individual
receives are less than the losses this individual imposes on another or on society
(Beccaria [1764] 1986, pp. viii, xxvii): crime is a rational, social cost-beneﬁt analysis
(Simon 2009, pp. 16–17).
Given his distance from Legal Enlightenment cost-beneﬁt analysis, Smith can avoid a
problem the Legal Enlightenment cannot: with a cost-beneﬁt analysis, there may be
immoral actions that remain unpunished because they produce more beneﬁts for the
criminal than costs for the victim. Working with the approbation of the impartial
spectator means that Smith avoids this problem. For him, individuals must never prefer
themselves to any other individual, as to hurt or injure someone, in order to beneﬁt
themselves, even if their beneﬁt should be much greater than the other’s costs. The poor
man must neither defraud nor steal from the rich, even if they might beneﬁt much more
than the rich man’s loss (TMS III.iii.6, p. 138).2
An additional difference between Smith and Legal Enlightenment thinkers is how
to direct behavior to improve one’s condition and society’s condition. For the
exponents of Legal Enlightenment, rational legislation and the constitutional framework are valid instruments to direct individual interest towards those activities and
conduct that better both one’s condition and public wealth (Simon 2009, 2011). But a
rational legislation or constitutional framework works only when we assume that the
actions of an individual are mainly logical and foreseeable, when we assume that the
individual is a rational agent very close to the neoclassical version of homo economicus. Instead, Smith’s agent is the opposite: he is not guided by utility maximization
but by sentiments that are not necessarily rational. So Smith, rather than being
conﬁdent in the rationality of an omniscient legislator (Haakonssen 1981, pp. 85–
86; Griswold 1999, pp. 250–252; Simon 2017), entrusts the task of safeguarding
wealth, happiness, and the respectability of the individual from the risk of immoral
actions, to the innate virtue of prudence and propriety, directed by the impartial
spectator who moderates human passions (TMS, VI.i.6, p. 213; see also Carrasco

2
Smith, in contrast with Grotius, following his own anti-utilitarianism and retributivism, refuses any
mitigating circumstance for crimes committed out of extreme poverty (Salter 1999).
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2008). His logic, as we will see below, parallels the one he uses to explain the growth
of an economy, rooting it in the passions of individual persons, not in a publicspirited, social, rational plan.

III. WHY PUNISHMENT?
If the desire to gain the approbation of the spectators around us is a motivation to commit
crimes, the judgment of the spectator inside us is the motivation for punishing these
crimes.
According to Smith, we judge the propriety of an action as well as its merits or
demerits (TMS, II). The propriety of an action concerns the causes of the action. The
merit of an action concerns its effects (TMS II.i.5.3, pp. 74–75).
When we see someone doing something to someone else, we may feel either gratitude
or resentment, meaning we believe that that behavior deserves either reward or punishment. Our judgment usually takes into consideration both the propriety and the merit of
the action, that is, both the actor’s motivation (propriety) and the consequence on the
other person (merit) (TMS II.i.5.5, p. 75; see also TMS, II.i.2.5, pp. 70–71). Our judgment
of merit completes and strengthens our judgment of propriety of the action. It generates
in us a desire to behave in a way that deserves moral reward and avoids resentment. So
when we identify with the resentment of the victim more than with the propriety of the
action, we think that punishment is appropriate (TMS II.i.4.4, p. 74). Our judgment is
generally not the arbitrary result of a partisan individual, since we are far enough from,
and uninvolved with, the action we observe. Our judgment is formed impartially, and
may receive conﬁrmation from a similar judgment by others, strengthening its validity
even more (Carrasco 2008).
Consequently, for Smith, punishment is the result of a spontaneous reaction of our
feeling of resentment. It is one of the most signiﬁcant distinguishing elements of
Smithian legal theory since it breaks with the mainstream of Legal Enlightenment,
which, on the contrary, founds punishment on the rational utilitarian calculation of
pleasures and pains. A consequentialist theory becomes incompatible with a theory
based on the judgment of worthiness of individuals in terms of assessment of the
motivations and propriety of the actor (C. Smith 2018). Smith is also able to offer a
more coherent justiﬁcation for punishment than philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant,
who try to use a general principle instead (Fleischacker 1988). Consistent with his
view of the natural emergence and evolution of institutions, Smith believes that
Nature has entrusted the formulation of rules of conduct not to a rationalistic logic
and a methodical speculation but rather to instincts and passions (TMS II.i.5.10,
pp. 77–78).
So, punishment is not a price that a rational legislator conceives to curb unwelcomed social actions but a natural reaction determined by a feeling of revenge, a
natural offspring of resentment (TMS II.i.2.5, pp. 70–71; TMS II.ii.1.5, pp. 79–80). In
contrast with other scholars of his age, Smith doesn’t banish vengeance from the
penal system (Fleischacker 1988). On the contrary, he endorses the appeasing of the
victim’s resentment through the pain of the guilty. The Smithian idea of punishment,
therefore, far from the new reformist trend of the eighteenth century, remains an
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expiation theory that can be summarized with the sequence of resentment–expiation–
gratiﬁcation.3 For Smith, though, this expiation is not a religious one and neither does
it aim to restore the authority of the sovereign through the torment of the criminal’s
body (cf. Foucault 1975, pp. 8–72). These latter expiations would be the base of the
“laws of police” rather than the “laws of justice,” a distinction that John Millar
attributes to Smith himself (Cairns 1988, p. 394).
Smith’s contrast with an author such as Cesare Beccaria is stark. Beccaria refuses to
use legal sanctions as an instrument to satisfy the victim, as they would be useless: “Can
the cries of a poor wretch turn back time and undo actions which have already been
done?” (Beccaria [1764] 1986, p. xii). Revenge is not restorative, thus useless. For
Smith, instead, justice is retributive, in the sense that it aims at the punishment of the
criminal, “without reference to any other goods that might arise” (Walen 2016).4 Our
feelings of resentment, and desire for revenge against the source of our suffering, are so
strong, so natural (and so irrational), that all animated beings feel them even against an
inanimate object that hurts them: “We are angry, for a moment, at the stone the hurts
us. A child beats it, a dog barks at it, a choleric man is apt to curse it” (TMS II.iii.1.1,
p. 94). Smith insists that “the object that caused [great harm] becomes so disagreeable to
us even after, and we take pleasure to burn or destroy it. We should treat, in this manner,
the instrument which had accidentally been the cause of the death of a friend, and we
should often think ourselves guilty of a sort of inhumanity, if we neglected to vent this
absurd sort of vengeance upon it” (TMS II.iii.1.1, p. 94). The feeling of gratitude for
inanimate objects that accidentally help us mirrors it (TMS II.iii.1.2, p. 94).
The piacular feeling of remorse or regret for the harm we unintentionally cause to
someone else is also an expression of the “absurd” strength of our feelings: we do not
question the propriety of our action, so we are not properly guilty of the accidental harm
we caused, and yet we desire to apologize or atone. Keith Hankins (2016) goes so far to
explain these irregular feelings as necessary to support and strengthen our moral
responsibility, given the pervasive presence of luck in our lives (see also Williams
1976; Schliesser 2013, 2017, pp. 121–136). Eric Schliesser (2017) goes farther and sees
the piacular as a “species of shame” that may lead to permanent “stain” and “real danger
to the mental health of well-formed minds” (Schliesser 2017, p. 129), so much so that
atonement for accidentally hurting others may include taking one’s own life.
The focus is thus strictly on the victim, not the criminal. Criminals do not need to
understand their punishment. Punishment is not deterrence: it is just the way to satisfy
the natural desire of seeing what the victim feels is the the morally deserved suffering in
the wrongdoer.
Alan Norrie (1989, pp. 230–234) distinguishes the idea of “retributivism,” which aims to amend the
criminal, from one of “retribution,” whose purpose is the mere gratiﬁcation of a victim’s resentment, and
which appears to be the real criterion selected by Smith. Less convincing is Norrie’s attempt to ﬁnd elements
of utilitarianism in Smith’s use of both concepts.
4
A standard deﬁnition of retributive justice: “The concept of retributive justice has been used in a variety of
ways, but it is best understood as that form of justice committed to the following three principles: (1) that those
who commit certain kinds of wrongful acts, paradigmatically serious crimes, morally deserve to suffer a
proportionate punishment; (2) that it is intrinsically morally good—good without reference to any other
goods that might arise—if some legitimate punisher gives them the punishment they deserve; and (3) that it is
morally impermissible intentionally to punish the innocent or to inﬂict disproportionately large punishments
on wrongdoers” (Walen 2016).
3
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But the victim’s desire for revenge risks excesses and disproportional reactions.
Revenge risks becoming cruelty. For Smith, the judge of the appropriate measure of
punishment is, again, the impartial spectator. The sympathy of the spectator is the judge
not only of the behavior deserving resentment but also of the measure within which this
resentment can be exercised and contained (TMS I.i.5.4, p. 24; LJA ii.90, p. 104). The
impartial spectator constrains the victim’s wish for vengeance into a fair retributive
punishment, as the impartial spectator will not approve of disproportionate reactions. In
addition, as shown below, the public magistrate will also play a role in institutionalizing
revenge into its proper constraints.
Furthermore, as Richard Stalley (2012, pp. 75–76) and Christel Fricke ([2011]
2017, pp. 234–235) well recognize (see also Fleischacker 2005; C. Smith 2013;
Schwarze and Scott 2015), for Smith, not all behaviors deserving moral reproof
deserve punishment. Hurting someone is what makes the difference between deserving and not deserving punishment (TMS II.ii.1.5, pp. 79–80; TMS, II.iii.3.2, pp. 105–
106). This is possibly one of the most important parts of the Smithian theory because it
explains the origin of justice and its unintentional role in the survival of society (for a
debate on whether distributive justice is part of this idea of justice, see Fleischacker
2005 and C. Smith 2013).
According to Smith, acts of charity and of disinterested benevolence deserve approval
and reward; but their omission or the lack of gratitude as a consequence of them do not
cause an intolerable unhappiness to people and do not expose them to any risk, and so do
not provoke indignation and hatred in the spectator (TMS II.ii.3.3–4, p. 86). Punishment
cannot be called for when charity or benevolence are missing. Indeed, the very idea of
using punishment to induce beneﬁcence would undermine the concept of beneﬁcence.
Benevolence and beneﬁcence cannot be extracted by force (see C. Smith 2013; see also
V. L. Smith and Wilson 2019); whereas hurting someone raises our resentment and
requires a strong response. This response satisﬁes the sense of justice, while, unintentionally, also defending individuals from other similar harmful acts. Therefore, as the
impartial spectator dictates, the only tasks of justice are redress and defense (TMS,
II.ii.1.4, p. 79).
The Smithian idea of injury in some aspects appears to coincide with the Legal
Enlightenment’s view of damage. Both break with the Ancien Regime tradition that
identiﬁed sin and crime; both deﬁne the seriousness of the criminal action and the
corresponding punishment. Yet, beyond the appearances there is a deep difference
between the two theories. The damage described in the works of utilitarian scholars is
the tangible result of an economic calculation of the loss and gain of socially undesirable
behaviors and the same for the punishment that should discourage them. Instead, Smith’s
injury is more about the sentiments of someone, harmed in his body, property, or
freedom, who feels above all that his dignity is injured. This is a subjective and personal
resentment, which the approbation of the impartial spectator transforms in a positive and
objective datum.
Smith does not offer a clear distinction between injuries deserving private punishment
and injuries that deserve an institutionalized punishment, most likely because the line
will depend on the peculiarity of societal circumstances. As we see below, different
societies have different legal structures, depending on what is appropriate to their
circumstances. Similarly the demarcation between a general wrongdoing and a crime
may be left to the peculiar circumstances of each society. In Smith, the distinction
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between a legal crime and a behavior that deserves punishment is not well deﬁned, even
if the two do not necessarily overlap.
Smith therefore consistently applies his understanding of human nature, which sees
human beings as creatures with sentiments rather than simply utility calculators, in both
his theory of crime and his theory of punishment. Grounded in individual feelings,
Smith’s theory of crime and punishment generates a theory of criminal justice based on
the individual person, and is not meant to promote what is good for society, even if it
does achieve this unintentionally. Smith’s criminal legal theory ﬁts comfortably within
the same system with which he describes the economic system, as well as within the
Scottish Enlightenment idea that well-functioning social institutions are the result of
human action but not of human design. However, his theory greatly diverges from the
views of the Legal Enlightenment.

IV. WHY PUBLIC MAGISTRATES?
Engaging in the study of the science of man implies distinguishing between the
permanent and the contingent. Smith sees that our desire to achieve the approbation
of others, through virtue and wealth, and our systematic overestimation of our probability of success and underestimation of our probability of failure, are permanent features
of our being. The presence of “the man within the breast” judging the propriety and the
merits of our actions is also part of our unchangeable nature. What is contingent is the
material and institutional context in which we live, including the level of wealth and the
opportunities to gain great wealth, and thus the strength of the incentives to commit
crimes.
In pre-commercial societies, the desire to parade wealth is just as strong as in
commercial societies, but there is less wealth to parade, so, everything else the same,
we observe little showing off of wealth. In a society of hunters, approbation comes
mostly from physical achievements or wisdom, since wealth is highly perishable, private
property is thus practically non-existent, and signiﬁcant accumulation of wealth is
unlikely. With no property, the only possible injuries are either physical or reputational.
These injuries do not beneﬁt the injurer though, so they are not very frequent, according
to Smith. Prudence and the impartial spectator work relatively well, given the weakness
of the incentives. There is no need for a civil authority and indeed there is none (LJB
I. 19-20, pp. 404–405; WN V.i.b. 2, p. 709).
But as wealth becomes less perishable and can be accumulated, private property is
more likely to be present, and wealth becomes an easier and less controversial way to
achieve the approbation of others. This also means that there is more wealth to seduce
and weaken moral restraints. And, given property, the injurer does beneﬁt from
injuring his victim. “Avarice and ambition in the rich … [and their] afﬂuence …
excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted
by envy, to invade his possessions”: crimes become more likely (WN V.i.b.2, p. 709)
and the presence of a civil magistrate becomes necessary to guarantee security. “It is
only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property,
which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive
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generations, can sleep a single night in security (WN V.i.b.2, p. 709): we now see penal
laws and judges enforcing them (WN V.i.b.2, p. 710).
For Smith, the origin of legal and civil authority therefore is a consequence of the
emergence of property and its diffusion (see also LJB I.11, p. 401), based on passions
such as avarice, ambition, indignation, envy, and fear. And when the division of labor
separates the roles of judge and legislator from that of executive, then we have secure
general rules that are freed from political expediency (WN III.ii–iv). The legitimacy of
political and juridical institutions are thus a by-product of the people’s approved conduct
(Carrasco 2008, p. 151).
So the ﬁrst condition under which punishment requires institutionalization is the
presence of crimes, which we see more often when there are the incentives to commit
them and fear of being a victim of one, that is, when there is wealth (WN V.i.b.2, pp. 709–
710; LJB I.11–13, pp. 401–402). The second condition is the possibility that punishment
escalates into disproportional revenge (TMS I.i.5.4, p. 24; LJA ii.90–100, pp. 104–108).
The injurer’s spectator is not impartial, by the simple fact that the injurer commits a
crime. The victim’s internal spectator may also not be impartial, given the closeness of
the injury. The unconscious temptation to magnify the hurt out of proportion is very
much present. If that is the case, punishment may not be proportional to the crime and
can escalate in a vicious spiral of violence. Legal justice and its public authority emerged
as a mechanism that evolved from mediating the fear of being injured, and private
vengeance and retaliation, which could otherwise escalate into a feud, “prevent[ing] the
ill consequences which might arise from those crimes [and] preserving the publick
peace” (LJA ii.95, p. 106).
Deterrence is obtained unintentionally by assuring the satisfaction of the victim’s
resentment (LJA ii.93, p. 105).5 What today we would recognize as efﬁciency is here
again an unintentional result—as usually happens when Smith analyzes the origin of
institutions. So, the fundamental feature of the Smithian idea of criminal justice is a
marked focus on the person, which contrasts with the holism typical of the Legal
Enlightenment’s theory of criminal justice as a social defense.
Smith’s legal theory is thus in open conﬂict with contract theories, as civil authority
emerges only under speciﬁc circumstances (WN V.i.b.1–12, pp. 708–715; LJB 92–93,
pp. 433–434), and not from a deliberate decision (see also the Lectures on Rhetoric and
Belles Lettres [1983], p. 176).6 It also differs from the theory of deterrence of the Legal
Enlightenment. In the center stage of Smith’s work there is always the individual person;
their interest is the ultimate aim of the authorities’ intervention. Justice is to defend each
person and their property, not society as a whole. We can see the pivotal role of the
individual person when we see that Smith puts the origin of the right to punish in the
resentment of the victim and in the gratiﬁcation of this personal sentiment. The
dissuasion from committing further hypothetical crimes is just one of the side effects
5
According to Stalley (2012, pp. 75–77) the natural desire to gain the approbation of others is a sentiment able
to induce the criminal to accept the punishment, admit the guilt, and repent. This spontaneous mechanism
allows an individualist punishment based on the resentment to procure a social vantage such as the correction
of criminals and the deterrence of further crimes. Yet Stalley focuses on the approbation process only to
explain how punishment works, without any reference to the reasons that motivate a crime.
6
Regarding Smith’s general legal theory, see also Haakonssen (1981); Malloy and Evensky (1994); Malloy
(2012, 2017); Lieberman (2006).
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of the penal rules, but it is not the main motive that turns resentment into a legal sanction7
(TMS II.ii.1.4–5, pp. 79–80). Smith is aware of this intellectual distance from the
exponents of Legal Enlightenment and underlines it, openly declaring his opposition
towards the theorists of “publick good” (LJA ii.91, p. 104). For Smith, these followers of
Hugo Grotius focus on the “correction of the offender,” on “the deterring of others,” and
on “the safety of the community” (LJA ii.169, p. 136), placing the defense of society ﬁrst
and only indirectly dealing with the individual. Smith explicitly overturns them with his
psychology of crime and punishment: he tells that, for example, we want to punish one
who stole some change from us, not because we are afraid that the loss of few pennies
will compromise our fortune but because the loss of those few small coins upsets
us. Similarly, we want to punish the person who injured another, not because we care
about society but because we care about the injured person (TMS, II.ii.3.10, pp. 89–90).
Furthermore, in contrast to the exponents of Legal Enlightenment who consider
punishment as lawful only when it discourages illegal acts, and vengeance as an
excessive suffering and thus an excessive cost to society, Smith believes that when
we stray from the criterion of resentment to embrace society’s security, in the name of
public interest, we risk inﬂicting punishment beyond the measure suggested by the
impartial spectator (LJA ii.91, p. 104).8 A legislator who adopts this doctrine could
punish innocuous behavior and limit personal freedom to maximize public welfare. In
addition, punishing to pursue public good may also be ineffective. Positive law may
mimic natural justice, but it may also follow utilitarian goals. Since punishment is the
consequence of human passions and feelings, if it pursues public targets that are
unconnected with natural resentment, individuals’ judgments may only feebly share
its propriety. This may be another of Smith’s most original contributions: utilitarian
punishment may fail. Indeed, Smith is so aware that punishment may fail and our
resentment go unsatisﬁed that he believes that to calm our tormented sentiments, we lean
on divine justice to make up for the lack of appropriate human justice (TMS II.ii.3.12,
p. 91; see also C. Smith 2018; and Schwarze and Scott 2015).
It may not be by accident that, if with a utilitarian criterion we punish some offenses in
a way that is deemed too light to satisfy the victim’s resentment, duels emerge as a way of
appeasement and to recover honor (LJA ii.137, p. 123). Similarly, in a more controversial
passage of TMS (II.ii.3.11, pp. 90–91), Smith allegedly claims that we justly punish with
death a sentinel who falls asleep, potentially jeopardizing the whole army, so that others
may be deterred from falling asleep. His language is tentative, though, reﬂecting the
hesitation of the impartial spectator and how reluctantly he makes himself agree that the
severity of the punishment is appropriate, given the absence of resentment. Smith goes
so far to claim that even “[a] man of humanity must recollect himself, must make an
effort, and exert his whole ﬁrmness and resolution, before he can bring himself either to
inﬂict it, or to go along with it when it is inﬂicted by others” (TMS, II.ii.3.11, p. 90; see
7
Even if Smith establishes a cardinal ordering of the punishment founded on the resentment analysis
(Lindgreen 1994, p. 66), unlike the authors of the Legal Enlightenment, he does not reach the formulation of a
theory of marginal deterrence, which is the core of today’s economic analysis of crime and punishment.
8
Smith’s dissent from the Legal Enlightenment theory of social defense could be the explanation of the
unpublished manuscript fragment that today is in the appendix of TMS edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L.
Macﬁe ([1759] 1984, p. 390). The risk of “improper punishment” arises when the justice renounces the
criterion of resentment and extends its task beyond the protection of natural rights (Simon 2013, p. 406).
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also LJA ii.90–2, pp. 104–105). The individual is sacriﬁced for the alleged well-being of
society and this decision is not necessarily approvable (see also Schwarze and Scott
2015; C. Smith 2018, 2019). David Raphael (1972–73, pp. 95–96) indicates this
reluctance to punish the sleepy sentinel as the exception that proves the rule: a
punishment perceived as excessive compared with the resentment it generates is
extremely difﬁcult to accept and perform exactly because we approve only of punishment proportioned to the crime. Witzum and Young (2013, p. 584) push Raphael’s
argument further, claiming that judging of it as just is an ex-post consideration of the
philosopher.
While the sentinel will be executed, even if extremely reluctantly, other crimes meant
to protect the whole society may not be punished if the positive law does not reﬂect
natural justice. When Britain punished with death the exportation of wool, claiming that
exporting wool would injure the whole society, it became almost impossible to ﬁnd
jurors or witnesses against the smugglers. People refused to inﬂict punishment for
something they did not see as meeting the conditions for resentment (LJA ii.90–2,
pp. 104–105; WN IV.viii.19, pp. 648–649). In this circumstance people show scarce
cooperation with the legal justice, jeopardizing its enforcement. Smith’s logic here is
remarkably similar to the one used to justify abandoning attempts to draft and enforce
economic policies meant to promote the public good: they generally are either superﬂuous or counterproductive (WN IV.ii.11, p. 456).

V. CONCLUSION
Smith believes that resentment is the original source of the right to punish, that it has to be
the main object of criminal justice, and that it is also the proper measure of a fair
punishment. He does not believe crime is the result of a rational calculation. Rather,
Smith sees crime as caused by envy and the immoderate desire of acquiring riches to
parade, through any means, combined with our systematic presumptuous hope of
success. So, a utilitarian punishment—based on a hedonistic calculation of pleasure
and pain and on a reliable forecast of the probability of enforcement—could not
effectively deter a criminal. Attempts to rationally redesign the criminal justice system
based on premises that do not correspond to human sentiments, such as utilitarian
criteria, would thus be unsuccessful.
The theory of criminal justice described in LJ and WN is consistent with the ethical
premises of TMS.9 Both are founded on the judgment of the impartial spectator, whose
imaginary and metaphorical role in the civil society is played by the magistrate. We thus
concur with John Cairns (1994, p. 54), who argues that, for Smith, common law is
founded on moral sentiments, as in judge-made law systems in which the magistrate
plays the role of the impartial spectator. This institutional actor judges by taking into
consideration the injury that the crime caused, the consequent resentment of the victim,
and the society that sympathizes with him.

9

In LJ there is an explicit reference to Smith’s lectures on moral theory, which deal with the topic (LJA i.36,
p. 17).
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Attempts to bring justice to the individual victim unintendedly create a well-functioning legal system, whereas attempts to rationally redesign this system, like some
Legal Enlightenment projects would propose, would switch the attention from individual justice to social public good. They would ignore human nature and the changing
circumstances of the reality of human praxis and local knowledge (Carrasco 2008;
C. Smith 2013) and thus risk creating more damage than the damage they intend to mend,
by having to force individuals to move, like pieces on a chessboard, in the directions they
would not want to move to.
The man of system … seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a
great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chessboard. He does not consider … [that] every single piece has a principle of motion of its
own altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon
it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human
society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely happy and successful. If
they are opposite or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at
all times in the highest degree of disorder. (TMS VI.ii.2.17, pp. 233–234)

This does not necessarily imply, as Paul Russell (1995, pp. 137–153) argues, that
Smith’s retributivist penal system, unlike Hume’s one, precludes any hypothesis of
legal reform and legal progress. Stalley (2012, pp. 82–85), replying to Bertrand
Russell, suggested instead that, for Smith, human beings are naturally inclined towards
change so that the evolution of their sentiments also determines the evolution of legal
systems.
Our position is instead that Smith rejects great rationalist reforms, such as a “man of
system” would design, and yet he hopes the wisdom of the “legislator” would introduce
single and speciﬁc reforms required by historical circumstances. This conclusion is also
shared by Donald Winch (1998, p. 372), who distinguishes Jeremy Bentham’s reformism from Smith’s (see also Haakonssen 1981, pp. 135–153; Cairns 1994, pp. 32–33;
Samuels and Medema 2005). This reading is also consistent with Haakonssen (1981)
and Cairns (1994), who argue that Smith prefers to entrust the reform of the legal system
to judges rather than the legislator. Craig Smith, though, believes that the legislator can
still play a positive role, when distinguished from the politician: “The legislator deals
with rules guided by general principles; ‘that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called
a statesman or politician’ (WN IV.ii.39, p. 468) deals in compromise and expediency”
(C. Smith 2013, p. 792).
Smith’s criminal theory, when considered in all its aspects—from the motivations to
commit crimes, to the justiﬁcation of punishment, to the emergence of a civil magistrate
—is remarkably consistent with his economic theory. Neither emerge from an intentional rational plan aimed at achieving some social good. Both rely on actions meant to
satisfy an individual’s passions instead. In both cases the social good or efﬁciency are the
results of human actions but not of human design. The “man of system” may be equally
dangerous for reforming both the economy and the law. Understanding human nature
with all its passions and sentiments, trusting individual persons despite all their biases
and limitations, generally unintentionally generates better functioning institutions than
the ones rationally designed but ignoring the passionate aspects of human nature. For
Smith, this is true of the economic system. And it is true also for the criminal legal
system.
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